Software injection operates within the operating system's permission model and faces scrutiny from kernel-level anti-cheat drivers. DMA operates at the hardware bus level, accessing physical memory addresses directly before the OS can intercept or validate the operation. This fundamental architectural difference creates distinct detection challenges.
Secure Boot validates firmware and driver signatures during early boot phases. DMA-capable devices often require custom Option ROMs or kernel drivers that lack Microsoft or OEM signatures. Disabling Secure Boot permits unsigned components to initialize before the operating system loads its security layers.
Most consumer-grade DMA devices use rewritable SPI flash memory for their firmware. The flashing process replaces the card's operational code but doesn't alter physical circuitry. You can restore original firmware or switch between different tool configurations by reflashing the same hardware multiple times.
The Input-Output Memory Management Unit creates hardware-enforced memory isolation between peripherals and system RAM. When properly configured, it restricts DMA devices to predefined memory regions rather than granting full physical address access. Disabling IOMMU or misconfiguring its groups removes these boundaries.